



Lesson

3.2

Police Tactical Planning Considerations for Force Protection (FP)

Aim



To familiarise the UNPOL members and units with
the police tactical planning process
in UN Peace Operations

Lesson Overview



- Police FP planning process
- The Six-Phases Operational Cycle
- Security Risk Management
- Summary





Learners will be able to:

- Explain the FP police planning process
- Apply the FP police planning methodology during police / combined operations and table-top exercise

Key Terms for FP Planning



- Tactical area of operations (TAO) – area narrowly defined for a **specific unit's** tactical deployment
- Potential Tactical Area of Operations – potential area for future tactical deployment
- Static and moving – unit's physical state for a tactical operation
- FP planning phases:
 - a. Current location / deployment
 - b. Transit
 - c. Tactical area of operation

Police Planning Process



Pre-Planning

- Analysis of need
- Analysis of the situation and of the operational environment: identify operational objectives
- Intelligence gathering


Planning

- Identification and analysis of courses of action
- Development of strategies and a plan for achieving operational goals and objectives
- Includes risk assessment

Implementation and Execution

- Preparation, resources, leadership, risk mitigation measures
- Production of an operations order and conduct the mission
- Evaluation of implemented orders



Police Decision Making Process



Information Requirements established / Continuous gathering of information





FP Planning Considerations



Tactical decision-making process

FP considerations for tactical decision-making process focuses on specific threats against your unit & ability to accomplishing its tasks; yet same DMP





Define the Problem

Receipt of mission

Accordance with UNPOL / FPU tasks:


- Protect United Nation personnel and property
- Contribute POC and human rights
- Support police operation that require a formed response or specialised capacity above the capability of IPOs
- (Prevent/detect crime; protect life/property; public order/safety; investigations and special operations)

A Force protection viewpoint:

- What are threats against us doing our task / operation
- What support / assets are provided to assist in our FP
- Medical facilities / CASEVAC
- Continue to refine Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) as it pertains to attacks against our unit




Mission Analysis





For the unit's:

- *Current location / deployment*
- *Do you need to transit to a new area*
- *Your future tactical area of operation*



Mission Analysis




Within the unit's current location; potential areas of transit; and the future deployment in their tactical area of operations

1. Continue to refine (OEE) Physical, Human, Information Terrain
2. Actor Evaluation (AE)- Identification of Key Actors
 - a. UN / Units / Forces
 - b. Host Nation security forces - possible assistance
 - c. Potential perpetrators / attackers
 - d. Communities - Potential for Civil Unrest
 - e. Third Parties supporting Perpetrators / attackers
 - f. Other International protection actors - possible assistance
3. Threat Analysis (Situational Integration)
 - a. Overview
 - b. Key Elements – Analysis of potential to attack / harm
 - c. Matrix – Predictive analysis of threat COAs (5Ws)
4. Risk Analysis
 - a. Vulnerability assessment
 - b. Capability assessment – Support provided
 - c. Danger level assessment
 - d. Risk analysis matrix



Mission analysis

Key actors




Our Unit and Mission

1. Current location / deployment; possible transit locations / routes and TAO (assigned or potential)
2. Determine:
 - Number, composition (minimal element for a tactical deployment)
 - C2 / Communications
 - Armored
 - Mobility
 - Defensive weaponry / riot gear
 - Intelligence / reconnaissance
 - Cyber Security Capabilities
 - Medical capacity / capabilities (Day , Night, CASEVAC)
 - Time Distances for others to support the unit (QRF, medical, etc.)
3. Attached, non-organic units, assets resources provided



Mission analysis

Key actors



UN Units (Support)

This include UN actors / units, military unit support assets / capabilities

Existing Mission coordination mechanisms / SOPs will facilitate support arrangements


1. Pinpoint location and area of operations
2. Determine:
 - Capabilities
 - Higher HQs assets / capabilities
 - Capacity and Mission HQs arrangements to support police operations
 - Interoperability / Communications
3. Identify the existing coordination mechanisms with the mission

Joint and Combined Operations



Public disorder and joint/combined operations

Public Disorder Situation	Considerations
Non-military nature	UN police component has primacy in support of or in cooperation with the host-state police and other law enforcement
Military nature or beyond capability of UN police	Military component has primacy in support of or in cooperation with the relevant host-state agencies
Unified and centralized structure	A designated senior UNPOL or UNMIL commander leads the joint task force's operations in a geographic area



Mission analysis

Key actors


Host State Security Forces (HSSF) - Potential Support

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations
2. Determine:
 - Number, composition and C2
 - Compliance
 - Capability and will to assist
 - Human rights records / Child soldiers
 - Corruption / Collusion
3. Identify the leaders
4. HSSF as potential perpetrators targeting UN units



Mission analysis

Key actors




UN / Units / Forces / HSSF

UN Force / HSSF	Type unit	command Relationship C2	Location	Number	Capabilities or support required to them	Time	Interoperability
A							
B							
C							

For the host state security forces, assessment should also include:

- Identification of leaders / the will to support us
- Capabilities and will to support and or assist in the protection of UN forces
- Required or in need of our support (logistics etc.,)
- Compliance to UN mandate, human rights violations' records; use of child soldiers



Mission analysis

Key actors

Potential perpetrators /
Attackers


Categorised into four types:

- Criminals (unsophisticated, sophisticated or organized)
- Protestors (vandals and activists, extremists...)
- Terrorists / armed groups / combatants
- Subversives (saboteurs, spies...)



Mission analysis

Key actors



Potential perpetrators

1. Pinpoint location and area of operations

2. Determine:

- Number, composition
- C2 / Communications
- Compliance
- Hostile intent and historical background
- Capabilities
- Human Rights Record / Child soldiers
- Social media access; mis/disinformation exposure;
- Religion / Ethnicity differences
- Logistical support from third part (knowledge, materials, intel)

3. Identify the leaders

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.


Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors



Mission analysis

Key actors

Potential Perpetrators




*For each
Armed /
Unarmed /
Organized
group within
the AOR or
potential TAO*

Group	Location	Number	Composition	C2 Commo	Intention
Perpetrator X					
Perpetrator Y					
Perpetrator Z					
Compliance	Capabilities	Religion / Ethnicity differences	Historical Background Patterns	Human Rights Record	Social Media Access



Attacks




Examples

Types of Attacks

- Direct Fire
 - Indirect fire
 - IED
 - Assault
 - Sabotage
 - Cyber
- Airborne / waterborne contamination
 - Throwing Rocks, clubs, slings, blowpipes
 - Small arms fire
 - Antitank weapons and mortars
 - NCB Agents
 - Hand grenades
 - Suicide / vehicle IEDs
 - Complex Attacks (two or more)
 - Intrusion / Disinformation campaigns

Mission analysis

Key actors



Civilian Communities – Potential for Unrest / Violence

1. Pinpoint location

2. Determine:

- Number of civilians (gender and age breakdown)
- Historical background for Civil Unrest / Violence
- Compliance- UN mandate, agreements, law and order
- Social Media access; mis/disinformation exposure: cell phones, internet access, hardware/software, internet cafés, etc.
- Access to weapons, explosives, IED building materials

3. Identify the local leaders

Information Requirements are established.


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Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism



Mission analysis

Key actors




Civilian Communities that may have a propensity for future Civil unrest / violence

	Civilian Community	Location	Numbers Gender ages	Compliance	Historical Background	Social Media Access	Access to weapons
<i>Civilian populations identified within the unit areas of operations</i>							



Mission analysis

Threat analysis



1. Priority consideration to threats identified at the Sector and mission level
2. We assess each identified actors / groups that pose a potential predator / attacker against our unit. Key element is to access intent and purpose
3. Determine the threat COA:
 - Potential perpetrators (Who)
 - Situation and type of threat (What)
 - Potentially affected unit (Whom)
 - Methods of operation / tactics (How)
 - Areas where your unit may be targeted (Where)
 - Motivation / Intent behind threat (Why)
 - Days and time of attacks are most likely (When)


Attacks include direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, Assaults, Cyber, Sabotage

Threats identified at current location / deployment, transit route areas, the tactical area of operations (TAO) for assigned and or potential



Mission Analysis

Threat analysis



Key Elements

For each group or Community within your unit's TAO


Group	Your Unit's Operation viewed as Antagonistic	Retaliation	Current threats Social media	
Group X	Concern	Concern	----	
Group Y	Concern	----	Concern	----
Group Z	----	----	----	----

Note: Group X and Y become Possible Perpetrators




Mission analysis

Threat identification



Threat in terms of their COA against your unit
(for each threat)

- | | |
|------------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Individuals / Groups | Who? |
| 2. The target (hard / soft) | What? |
| 3. Unit being attacked | To Whom? |
| 4. Type of attack, method, tactics | How? |
| 5. Geographical scope / local | Where? |
| 6. Motive / intent | Why? |
| 7. Time-frame | When? |



Mission analysis


Threat identification

For each identified threat

Who	What	Whom	How	Where	Why	When
Threat 1 Perpetrator X	Direct fire	Our Unit Z	3-man hit/run Ambush	Yantown X turn mid town	Armed Grp outside Peace agreement	D-Day+3 Morning hours
Threat 2 Group X	IED	Our Unit Y	Emplace night before, observe, use Triggerman	Gyton Route B Beta Bridge	Spoil mandate/ embarrass	D-Day +1 0700 Hrs
Threat # Perpetrator X	IED	Our Unit Y	In Vehicle on MSR	Lat-Lon	Economic Criminal- UN closed illegal mine	Night D-day
Threat 4 Group Y	Indirect fire, rocks pipes	Our Unit Z	Demonstration Agitators make it violent	Clayton	Political dispute / anger directed UN	Working Hours D-Day +2
Threat 5 Group C	Direct fire	Our Unit C	2man sniper team, 200 outside town v	Town of Lat-Lon	Retaliation	D-Day School Hours





Mission analysis




Risk assessment / analysis

primary components



Risk analysis matrix



Vulnerability Assessment

Mission analysis

Risk assessment




Vulnerability

- What is the vulnerability of our unit being targeted?
- Unit's capabilities to perform operational tasks

Probable result if a vulnerability is exploited- predictive analysis:

- Potential casualties/ impact to operation
- Losses of key elements
- Losses of critical capabilities
- Point of not being able to carry out the mission



Vulnerability Assessment

Mission analysis

Risk assessment

Our unit's vulnerability for each threat identified

Threat	C2 Commo	Armor	Mobility	Fire- power	Intel	Cyber	Medical	Size / Coefficient Min unit for tactical deployment	Time Distances for others to Support your unit
Threat 1									
Threat 2									
Threat 3									



Support Actor
Capability
Assessment

Mission analysis

Risk assessment



FP support capability assessment


FP Support Actor / UN unit 1

Threat	Intention to protect	Distance Vs. mobility	Capability	Interoperability
Threat X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Threat Y	No	Yes	Yes	No
Threat Z	?	No	Yes	No

FP Support Actor / UN unit 2

Threat	Intention to protect	Distance Vs. mobility	Capability	Interoperability
Threat X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Threat Y	No	Yes	Yes	No
Threat Z	?	No	Yes	No

For each potential FP Support actor / UN unit in the areas of current location / deployment, Transit areas, and TAO both assigned and potential .



Danger Level Assessment

Mission analysis

Risk assessment

Danger Level assessment


For each Threat

Threat	Intent	Perpetrator Capacity vs Unit Capabilities	Historical	Other- (Commander concern)
Threat 1	High	High	High	High
Threat 2	Low	High	Medium	Low
Threat 3	Medium	Low	Medium	Low




Mission analysis

Risk assessment




For each threat






Courses of Action Development



- Develop plans / COAs to reduce, neutralise, or eliminate the threat
- Reduce likelihood
- Reduce impact
- Support synchronisation
- Accordance to DUF, POC frameworks
- By phase




Courses of Action Development



Range of responses for mitigating risks- Demonstrations

Situation	Risk level	Examples of an approach
Regular, neutral, or passive situation, during lawful and peaceful assemblies	low	Presence, dialogue, information, and de-escalation
Non-compliant, resistant or evasive situation presenting non-deadly threat, such as unlawful non-violent assemblies	Medium	Show of force, where all other means of peaceful de-escalation failed, use of force in a reasonable and proportional manner
Situation presents an imminent deadly threat or serious bodily harm	High	Application of proportional, reasonable use of firearms, with intentional lethal force to protect life



FP COAs to Mitigate Risks



Threat	Threat 1	Threat 2	Threat 3
Who	Unit to execute tasks		
What	the tasks		
When	Critical timing		
Where	Location		
How	Concept / maneuver		
Why	Purpose End State		
To Whom	Directed at threat group		




CoA Selection and Orders Production

- Advantages - disadvantages assessment
- Vet COAs via UN mission pillars – impact– political, humanitarian, security; information operations, media
- Brief commander for approval
- Resources, additional FP assets / support requested
- Operations Order-coordinated, authenticated, reviewed, published, distributed
- Briefed to higher HQs for approval
- Sections / units briefed
- Establish NAIs for execution , continue answering IRs



CoA Selection and Orders Production




Orders / briefing format

- Situation
- Mission
- Execution (tasks defined, allocated to the actors, sequencing, risk mitigation measures)
- Administration and logistics
- Command and control (responsibilities, leadership)
- Briefings: before, during, after





Logistic preparation



Personnel:

manpower, roles, briefing, dress



Vehicles:

APCs, specialized vehicles, transport of suspects...



Communications:

portative radios, fixed radio, phones...



Protective

equipment: bullet proof vest and helmet...



Weaponry:


type, volume, gas canisters, ammunition...



Other logistic means:

tools, water, food, drones...







Execution



- Coordination, link up with support units, assets
- Continue to conduct assessments
- May restart decision cycle to adjust plan
- Rehearsals
- Coordinate with other interlocutors and actors





Execution







Execution



Perpetrators




TL



Commander



Monitor and Refine



- As situations changes, refine and adjust plan
- Reporting
- Medical evacuations
- Continue monitoring of threat and potential violent actors
- Re-organize, refit, and prepare for future operations
- Conduct debriefs, after mission report
- After action reviews and capture lessons learned



- All unit operations require a DMP FP focus; mission analysis is key
- Plan FP from unit's current location, transit, future TAO
- Mandate implementation never straightforward; requires a threat-based analysis
- COAs mitigate risks by neutralising the threat, reducing the impact of a threat or the likelihood
- FP requires coordination in and outside the UN Mission
- Risk analysis guide prioritisation of threats



Questions